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INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, the Supreme Court started a revolution in environmental 
law.  In Rapanos v. United States,1 while addressing jurisdiction over wet-
lands under the Clean Water Act, the Court purported to clarify an 
issue of statutory interpretation. In reality, the Court had reentered 
the fray in a four-way struggle for supremacy in constitutional mean-
ing.  This struggle involves all three branches of government and, to a 
large extent, the federal agencies that implement the Constitution as 
part of their everyday function:  the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(the Corps) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).   
The Rapanos decision was widely criticized when it was handed 
down,2 but there has been no real empirical analysis of how the decision 
has affected the agencies’ on-the-ground interpretations of their own 
jurisdiction.  In this Comment, I examine the fallout from Rapanos—
beginning with its impact on the judicial, legislative, and executive 
branches—and then focus on its impact on the Corps’s process for 
determining its own jurisdiction.  Procedurally, the main effect of the 
decision has been to add density to the Corps’s already onerous per-
mitting process.3  Substantively, the decision has forced the Corps to 
add an unnecessary judicial gloss to its scientific determinations, im-
posing court-like reasoning onto professional engineers.4  Perhaps 
worst of all, the increased enforcement costs of these changes have 
 
1 547 U.S. 715 (2006).   
2 See, e.g., Mark Latham, Rapanos v. United States:  Significant Nexus or Significant 
Confusion?  The Failure of the Supreme Court to Clearly Define the Scope of Federal Wetland  
Jurisdiction (criticizing Rapanos as shifting the “jurisdictional question” from a state of 
“uncertainty to one of the absurd”), in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER 
ACT:  FIVE ESSAYS 5, 13-16 (L. Kinvin Wroth ed., 2007); Charles Duhigg & Janet Roberts, 
Rulings Restrict Clean Water Act, Hampering E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at A1 (re-
porting that Rapanos has created “widespread uncertainty” for federal and state regula-
tors and has eroded federal ability to protect the environment); Brad Marten, Post-
Rapanos Rulings Continue to Bedevil Developers, Agencies, Courts and Congress, MARTEN L. 
(Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20100428-post-rapanos-rulings 
(indicating that the ongoing post-Rapanos confusion will likely continue into the future).    
3 See infra Section IV.B.    
4 See infra Part V.   
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been shifted to the regulated community.  All players in the game—
developers seeking quick disposition of permitting requests, environ-
mentalists pursuing wetlands protection, and agency personnel tasked 
with making jurisdictional determinations—have come out as losers 
after Rapanos.   
Based on these findings, I propose a radical shift in judicial review 
of agency constitutionalism and argue that the Court should apply the 
Chevron doctrine5 to certain agency constitutional interpretations.  In 
particular, where Congress has clearly delegated constitutional defini-
tion to an agency and such definition implicates agency expertise, 
courts should explicitly grant Chevron deference to the agency consti-
tutional interpretation.  This paradigm would allow Congress the 
broadest possible latitude in exercising its power and would restore 
the institutional benefits lost when courts impose judicial constraints 
on administrative agencies that operate differently from the courts by 
design.  Thus, when Congress clearly delegates constitutional interpre-
tation to agency expertise, the judiciary should defer to the agency’s 
interpretations so long as they are reasonable.   
Part I provides a brief overview of scholarship exploring the role 
that extrajudicial actors play in constitutional interpretation.  Part II 
introduces wetlands, explains their importance, and discusses the Clean 
Water Act, the statute that underlies their regulation.  Part III explores 
each branch’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act under the Com-
merce Clause, addressing the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, 
including the Rapanos decision, as well as congressional and executive 
responses.  Part IV turns to how the agencies have interpreted their col-
lective jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, discussing both general 
principles of agency statutory interpretation and the narrow issue of 
how the EPA and the Corps have responded to Rapanos.  Part V provides 
a case study of agency constitutional interpretation, examining a series 
of jurisdictional determinations by the Corps to demonstrate that  
Rapanos has resulted in increased bureaucracy, undermined the agen-
cies’ flexibility, and forced courtlike procedures and reasoning onto an 
expert agency.  Finally, Part VI uses these conclusions to argue that the 
 
5 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 
(1984) (holding that courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous 
statutory language as long as it is “reasonable”).  For further discussion on the scope of 
Chevron, in general and under my proposal, see infra Parts IV and VI.   
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Court should abandon its current treatment of agency constitutional 
interpretation and instead adopt Chevron deference where Congress 
has clearly delegated constitutional interpretation to agency expertise.  
While this would represent a radical shift in judicial oversight, I argue 
that this degree of deference is the only mechanism by which Congress 
and agencies can protect fundamental interests such as the environ-
ment; respond appropriately to advances in scientific knowledge; and 
enforce the underlying purpose of statutes without being tethered to a 
rigid, textual interpretation of constitutional mandates.   
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION OUTSIDE THE COURTS 
In the conventional narrative of American law, the Supreme Court 
functions as the primary, if not exclusive, interpreter of the U.S. Con-
stitution.6  Recently, however, scholars and citizens alike have begun 
exploring to what extent, under what authority, and through what nor-
mative lens nonjudicial actors interpret the Constitution.7  This inquiry 
has focused both on actors outside of government, such as social 
movements, and other governmental institutions, such as the executive 
and legislative branches.8  Theorists have primarily addressed three 
questions:  First, to what extent, and with what analytical tools, are 
nonjudicial actors interpreting the constitution?9  Second, what effect 
 
6 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
7 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1379-80 (1997) (arguing that much constitutional 
interpretation occurs outside of the courts).  An example of citizens’ exploration came 
in the 2010 midterm elections, which heralded the rise of the Tea Party, a conservative 
political group advocating a constitutional interpretation in direct conflict with both 
Supreme Court precedent and longstanding congressional practice.  See Jeffrey Rosen, 
Radical Constitutionalism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, § 6 (Magazine), at 34 (discussing a 
“newly elected Tea Party senator[’s]” plan to eliminate the Departments of Education 
and Housing and Urban Development on “constitutional grounds”). 
8 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 247-48 (2004) (insisting that U.S. citizens return to a regime 
under which the Supreme Court is subordinate to popular will); Robert Post & Reva 
Siegel, Roe Rage:  Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
373, 379 (2007) (proposing the adoption of “democratic constitutionalism,” an empiri-
cal model under which judicially created constitutional judgments acquire “democratic 
legitimacy” only if they are based in “popular values and ideas”).   
9 See, e.g., STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT:  
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 145 (2008) (examining the role of conservative 
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have nonjudicial interpretations had on judicial opinions interpreting 
the Constitution and on the evolution of constitutional scholarship 
and meaning in the United States?10  Third, as a normative matter, who 
should have ultimate interpretive authority:  courts, another branch of 
government, the “people,” or some combination of all three?11 
The goal of this scholarship has been to question and expand upon 
the traditional judge-centric view of constitutional interpretation.  In-
stead of a world in which the Supreme Court hands down constitu-
tional rulings and functions as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional 
meaning, these scholars see much of the practical identification of 
constitutional parameters as being performed by extrajudicial actors; 
including administrative agencies;12 the executive and legislative 
branches;13 and the American people themselves via social movements 
and other mechanisms.14  
 
legal scholars in promoting “originalism” as a credible canon of constitutional interpre-
tation); Post & Siegel, supra note 8, at 379 (discussing how our “representative govern-
ment and mobilized citizens” enforce the Constitution).   
10 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:  Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 201-02, 226-36 (2008) (exploring how the “culture war” 
over gun rights that preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller most likely influenced its constitutional analysis).   
11 See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation:  
Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 121-23 (2004) 
(arguing in favor of functional departmentalism, in which each branch has an “obliga-
tion to interpret the Constitution,” but must conform its interpretation to constitutional 
constraints); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:  Executive Power to Say 
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 223-25, 321-22 (1994) (maintaining that the executive 
branch should exercise its powers as a coequal branch in constitutional interpretation 
and characterizing the current trend of executive deference to the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional interpretation as “too-feeble acquiescence”).   
12 See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise:  Administrative Censorship and 
the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 96-100 (2000) (chronicling the 
FCC’s role throughout the twentieth century in content-based speech regulation under 
the First Amendment).   
13 See, e.g., Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 
18 Op. O.L.C. 199 (1994) (discussing the President’s authority to decline to enforce a 
statute when he believes it is unconstitutional and thinks it probable that the Supreme 
Court would agree); Paulsen, supra note 11, at 263-64 (discussing different methods of  
executive review, including pardons, vetoes, nonexecution, and nonacquiescence). 
14 Cf. KRAMER, supra note 8, at 246-53 (advocating a return to constitutionalism 
driven by popular will).   
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The role of administrative agencies in performing constitutional  
interpretation has been relatively underexplored.15  Nominally func-
tioning under statutory authority, agencies face opportunities for con-
stitutional interpretation quite frequently in practice.16  For example, 
Professor Reuel Schiller traced the influence of the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) on modern First Amendment doctrine.  
His analysis showed that the FCC, in regulating broadcast speech, main-
tained the autonomy to resist restrictive applications of the First 
Amendment, and served as the primary constitutional decisionmaker 
for free speech rights.17  Similarly, Professor Sophia Lee’s archival  
research into agency behavior during the 1960s revealed contrasting 
visions of discrimination policy under the Fourteenth Amendment 
between the FCC and the Federal Power Commission (FPC), uncover-
ing a seminal, and previously unnoticed, instance of agency constitu-
tionalism.18  Conventional wisdom holds the Constitution to be fixed 
in meaning, requiring the expert analysis of the judiciary, but in many 
contexts the Constitution’s meaning is indeterminate, open to inter-
pretation, and largely unaddressed by the courts.19  It is in this vast 
space of indeterminate constitutional meaning that agencies can, do, 
and should interpret the Constitution directly. 
 
15 See, e.g., Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking:  Administrative Constitutionalism 
and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 809-10 (2010) (“[L]egal schol-
ars . . . have not yet examined ordinary administrators as constitutional actors.”).  Scholars 
in the field have examined instead how agencies implement the Constitution in various 
contexts.  See, e.g., id. at 810-21, 847-57 (chronicling divergent interpretations of equal 
protection by the FCC and the Federal Power Commission during the latter half of the 
twentieth century); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and 
Section Five Power:  Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE 
L.J. 1943, 2014-20 (2003) (discussing Congress’s own interpretation of equal protection 
and the Commerce Clause when crafting the FMLA).   
16 See Lee, supra note 15, at 809 (“[A]dministrative law scholars . . . have recognized 
that administrators must interpret the Constitution in their day-to-day work.”); see also 
Paulsen, supra note 11, at 223, 278-84 (acknowledging that the executive branch is often 
the first branch to apply the Constitution to novel legal issues). 
17 See Schiller, supra note 12, at 96-100; see also id. at 101 (“The FCC, not the judici-
ary, acted as the constitutional decisionmaker.”).   
18 See Lee, supra note 15 at 880-82 (finding that, in the 1960s, the FCC enacted equal 
employment rules and creatively expanded state action, while the FPC rejected equal 
employment rules and creatively narrowed state action).   
19 See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 506 (2010) (describing the indeterminate nature of constitu-
tional law and agencies’ role in constitutional interpretation).   
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Since this practical reality of on-the-ground agency constitutional 
interpretation is at odds with the traditional judge-centric vision of 
constitutional definition, this type of constitutionalism has received 
little attention from scholars and even less respect from the courts.20  
Typically, a court reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute will 
apply Chevron deference, a two-step inquiry that favors the agency’s 
interpretation.21  First, if the statute at issue has a clear meaning, that 
meaning will prevail.22  If the statute’s meaning is ambiguous, the court 
will proceed to the second step, in which it will defer to the agency’s 
interpretation so long as it is “reasonable.”23  As Justice Stevens, writing 
for the Court in Chevron, explained, “[t]he responsibilities for assessing 
the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between 
competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones:  ‘Our 
Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.’”24 
 In reviewing agency constitutional interpretations, however, courts 
do not apply Chevron deference.  Instead, courts refuse to defer if the 
challenged action raises “serious” constitutional issues.25  Given the 
wide range of circumstances in which agencies interpret the Constitu-
tion, this disparate treatment requires further examination.  The re-
mainder of this Comment conducts such an inquiry through the lens 
of agency jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, examining interpre-
 
20 See id. (“Why the Court is so reluctant to acknowledge the role played by constitu-
tional concerns in the development of ordinary administrative law is somewhat of a 
puzzle.”). 
21 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984).   
22 Id.   
23 Id. at 843-45.  In practice, the Court’s use of deference may not be this simple.  
After conducting an empirical study of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation 
cases since Chevron, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer identified a “continuum” of 
deference, noting that the Court did not apply Chevron in many cases where the agency 
action appeared to merit deference.  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The 
Continuum of Deference:  Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098-136 (2008).  For the purpose of my argu-
ment, I focus on a simpler conception of judicial deference.   
24 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 
(1978)).  
25 See, e.g., Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 661-63 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Solid 
Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74 (2001) (refusing to 
grant deference to the Corps’s “Migratory Bird Rule” because it raised “significant con-
stitutional questions”).   
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tations by the Supreme Court, Congress, the Executive, and, finally, the 
agencies themselves.  My findings demonstrate that the Supreme Court 
should articulate a separate standard of review for agency constitu-
tional interpretation:  courts should grant deference where Congress 
has clearly delegated its enforcement to an agency’s expertise.26  
II.  WETLANDS:  NAVIGATING TRICKY WATERS   
Historically, wetlands were considered “worthless swamps” and 
nothing more than impediments to development.27  In recent years, 
however, with the country facing wetlands loss in various ecosystems,28 
wetlands conservation has risen to prominence as scientists learn more 
about wetlands’ benefits to human populations, including flood mod-
ulation, groundwater preservation, nutrient and sediment retention, 
and storm surge protection.29  However, this mounting concern for 
wetlands has not rendered them less attractive to farmers and devel-
opers looking to expand.  As the amount of available land has dimin-
ished because of suburban sprawl and population growth, wetlands are 
 
26 Other theorists have proposed different relationships between agency constitu-
tional interpretation and the courts.  See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 23, at 1115-17 
(proposing “anti-deference” when an agency interpretation raises serious constitutional 
problems); Metzger, supra note 19, at 534-36 (arguing for more transparency in agency 
constitutional interpretation).  These arguments are addressed in more depth in Part VI. 
27 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State:  A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 80 (2010).   
28 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS AND TREND OF WETLANDS IN THE COTER-
MINOUS UNITED STATES 2004 TO 2009, at 40 (2011) (noting, from 2004 to 2009, an av-
erage annual loss of 13,800 acres of wetlands overall but more significant losses to “salt 
marsh” and “freshwater forested” wetlands); see also EPA, WETLANDS OVERVIEW 2 (2004), 
available at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/overview_pr.pdf.    
29 See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 27, at 80-81; see also THEDA BRADDOCK WITH CON-
TRIBUTIONS FROM L. REED HOPPMAN, WETLANDS:  AN INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGY, THE 
LAW, AND PERMITTING 5 (1995) (“Changes in hydrology can alter wetlands to uplands 
and vice versa.”).  Hurricane Katrina was a striking example of how wetlands erosion 
can wreak havoc; some scientists argue that the damage was exacerbated by the levees’ 
effect on surrounding wetlands.  See, e.g., Hurricane Risk for New Orleans, AM. RADIO-
WORKS (Sept. 2002), http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/wetlands/ 
hurricane1.html (predicting, three years prior to Hurricane Katrina, disastrous effects 
if a hurricane were to hit New Orleans because the natural buffer provided by the wet-
lands that surround the city had been eroding).  Wetlands also provide significant eco-
logical benefits for a host of plant and animal species.  See EPA, supra note 28, at 2 
(describing the benefits wetlands provide to “thousands of species of aquatic and ter-
restrial plants and animals”).  
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prime candidates for such expansion due to their ubiquity.30  If the 
Corps asserts jurisdiction over a particular waterway, costs for private 
development skyrocket, since such a determination invokes a proce-
durally complex permitting process that must be completed prior to 
dredging or filling on a jurisdictional wetland.31  The tension between 
environmentalists intent on preserving wetlands and industry advo-
cates eager to build on undeveloped land and expand agricultural  
potential has led to contentious fights over the Corps’s high-stakes  
wetlands regulation.32  
The Clean Water Act (the CWA or the Act) is designed “to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.”33  To accomplish this goal, the Act makes illegal the 
 
30 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 28, at 37-39, 42 fig.23 (noting the  
existence of more than 110 million acres of wetlands, found in every one of the lower 
forty-eight states, and the continued role that agricultural development plays in wet-
lands loss); LeRoy Hansen, Wetland Status and Trends (explaining that wetlands cover 
more than seven percent of the nonfederal lands in the contiguous forty-eight states, 
and showing that conversion to agricultural uses accounted for an average loss of 
593,000 acres per year from 1954 to 1974), in U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL 
RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS 42, 42-44 (2006); see also Jos T.A. 
Verhoeven & Tim L. Setter, Agricultural Use of Wetlands:  Opportunities and Limitations, 
105 ANNALS BOTANY 155, 156-57, 161-62 (2010) (noting that increased demand for 
food worldwide will place more of a strain on wetlands through agricultural use).   
31 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, REGULATORY JURISDICTION OVERVIEW 3-7, available 
at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/regulatory/reg_ juris_ov.pdf 
(outlining the Corps’s jurisdiction and describing the numerous steps within a permit-
ting decision).  According to regulations promulgated pursuant to the CWA, 
[t]he term wetlands means those areas that are inundated or saturated by sur-
face or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and 
that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typi-
cally adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.  Wetlands generally include 
swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.   
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2011) (emphasis omitted).   
32 See, e.g., David Slade, Developer Seeks to Fill Wetlands, POST & COURIER ( July 12, 2010), 
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2010/jul/12/developer-seeks-to-fill-wetlands 
(describing a “long-running fight” over a proposed commercial development on wet-
lands recently determined by the Corps to be jurisdictional and subject to federal per-
mitting requirements); Wetlands Permit Gums Up the Works, WASH. EXAMINER, http:// 
washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/2008/12/wetlands-permit-gums-works/26400 (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2012) (chronicling a six-year permit battle between various state and 
federal regulators, residents, and local authorities over the dredging of two three-foot-
deep channels for local boat access).   
33 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).  The Act was originally called the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), but acquired the common 
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discharge of any pollutant into “navigable waters.”34  The statute de-
fines navigable waters as “waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas,”35 and delegates regulatory authority for the Act’s en-
forcement to both the EPA and the Corps.36  For a short period of time 
following the enactment of the CWA, the Corps applied the traditional 
judicial definition of navigable waters to the statute, which referred to 
“interstate waters that are ‘navigable in fact’ or readily susceptible of 
being rendered so.”37  But after a district court held these regulations 
to be too narrow,38 the Corps drafted new regulations that explicitly 
stretched its jurisdiction to the “outer limits of Congress’s commerce 
power.”39  Under current regulations, the Corps’s jurisdiction is very 
broad and has included wetlands since the late 1970s.40  This provision 
has been interpreted as far as the Commerce Clause allows, in accord-
 
name “Clean Water Act” through amendments in 1977.  Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. 
L. No. 95-217, sec. 2, § 518, 91 Stat. 1566, 1566.   
34 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (making illegal the “discharge of any pollutant”); id. 
§ 1362(12)(A) (defining such discharge as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable 
waters”). 
35 Id. § 1362(7). 
36 See id. §§ 1251(d), 1344(a), (d). 
37 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723-24 (2006) (quoting The Daniel Ball, 
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)).   
38 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 
1975) (holding that “navigable waters,” as used in the CWA, is “not limited to the tradi-
tional tests of navigability,” and requiring the Corps to expand its definition of “naviga-
ble waters” to “the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause”).   
39 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 724 (citing Permits for Discharge of Dredged or Fill Material 
into Waters of the United States, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,144, 37,144 n.2 ( July 19, 1977)); see 
also Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC Be Right?  A New 
Look at the Legislative History of the Clean Water Act, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,042, 11,045 
(2002) (describing congressional debates over the proper geographic scope of the 
Corps’s jurisdiction and the concerns of some members of Congress that “the Corps 
was not reaching as far as it could, or should”).  
40 See L. Kinvin Wroth, Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER 
ACT, supra note 2, at 1; see also Margaret “Peggy” Strand & Lowell M. Rothschild, What 
Wetlands Are Regulated?  Jurisdiction of the § 404 Program, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,372, 10,375 
(2010) (“The current Corps regulations continue to reflect the results of the 
1975 . . . Callaway decision and provide that the CWA applies to very broad categories 
of waters.” (footnote omitted)).  For the Corps’s current definition of “waters of the 
United States,” see 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2011) (emphasis omitted). 
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ance with the legislative history indicating Congress’s intention for the 
Act to apply as broadly as constitutionally permissible.41   
Various governmental actors have used this broad, open-ended 
mandate as an invitation to extend jurisdiction over wetlands as far as 
possible, while other actors have pushed back against this sweeping 
interpretation.  Part III explores this interplay and discusses how each 
branch—judicial, legislative, and executive—has handled wetlands 
jurisdiction during the last decade by focusing on the Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in Rapanos v. United States.42  Part IV then 
turns to the agencies’ reactions and examines how the Corps has rede-
fined its own jurisdiction in response to changed mandates from the 
Supreme Court.   
III.  THREE COMPETING STRANDS OF COMMERCE  
CLAUSE INTERPRETATION 
This Part briefly addresses how the three branches of government 
have interpreted jurisdiction under the CWA in order to show the 
constraints imposed and the authority conferred by each branch on 
the agencies’ power to define the outer limits of Commerce Clause 
jurisdiction. 
A.  Judicial Interpretations of “Waters of the United States” 
During the last ten years, the Supreme Court has become more in-
volved in defining the jurisdictional boundaries of the Clean Water Act 
and has thereby profoundly shifted how the agencies handle their own 
jurisdiction.  In its 2001 decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County v. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), the Court struck down the 
Corps’s “Migratory Bird Rule,” which had extended the Act’s jurisdic-
tion to isolated ponds visited by migratory birds.43  The Court deter-
mined that this rule stretched the Corps’s powers under the Commerce 
 
41 See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,127 ( July 19, 1977) (“The legislative history of the 
term ‘navigable waters’ specified that it ‘be given the broadest constitutional interpreta-
tion unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be made 
for administrative purposes.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-1465, at 144 (1972) (Conf. 
Rep.))).  For a more detailed discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see infra 
Section III.B.   
42 547 U.S. 715. 
43 531 U.S. 159, 171-74 (2001).  
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Clause too far, rendering some jurisdictional determinations made 
pursuant to the rule outside the ambit of the Act’s authority.44  In the 
wake of this holding, a series of lower court decisions reflected a pro-
tracted, contentious, and confusing struggle over how to apply 
SWANCC to new sets of facts, typically involving complicated hydrogeo-
logic determinations.45  One environmental scholar considered SWANCC 
to be “the most devastating judicial opinion affecting the environment 
ever.”46 
In 2006, the Court again took up the issue in two consolidated cases, 
Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
where it addressed the question of what level of connection is required 
between wetlands and navigable waters to justify jurisdiction under the 
CWA and, implicitly, the Commerce Clause.47  The Court did not issue 
a majority opinion.  Instead, it articulated two tests with which the 
agencies have grappled in the ensuing five years:  the plurality’s test, as 
formulated by Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” 
test.   
Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of four, determined that “the 
waters of the United States” include “only those relatively permanent, 
standing or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic 
features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] . . . 
oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’”48  Under this test, only wetlands with a 
“continuous surface connection” to such waters may be regulated by 
 
44 Id. at 173-74.   
45 For example, the Court of Federal Claims declined to apply SWANCC at all when 
deciding a wetlands case just ten months later.  See Laguna Gatuna v. United States, 50 
Fed. Cl. 336, 338, 343 (2001) (holding that a playa lake “not hydrogically connected to 
any other water source” was within the EPA’s jurisdiction); see also United States v. 
Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. 2d 751, 765 (E.D. Va. 2002) (denying jurisdiction over 
wetlands where the water’s passage through miles of nonnavigable ditches and culverts 
“before finding navigable waters” complicated the determination), rev’d sub nom. 
Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003).   
46 William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution:  SWANCC and 
Beyond, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,741, 10,741 (2001); see also Matthew A. MacDonald, Com-
ment, Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 
31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 322-23 & n.21 (2007) (noting that, after SWANCC, the 
status of non-navigable tributaries and adjacent wetlands “remained in doubt,” and 
discussing three different lower court tests for such waters). 
47 See 547 U.S. at 729-30 (plurality opinion).   
48 Id. at 739 (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL  
DICTIONARY 2282 (2d ed. 1954)).   
Brader_FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)  4/17/2012 2:52 PM 
2012] Toward a Constitutional Chevron 1491 
 
the Corps.49  Scalia set forth a two-step analysis:  first, the Corps must 
determine that there is a traditional “wate[r] of the United States,” 
which he defines as “a relatively permanent body of water connected 
to traditional interstate navigable waters,” and, second, it must find a 
continuous surface connection between that waterway and the wet-
lands at issue.50  Only after satisfying both criteria may the Corps 
properly assert jurisdiction.   
Justice Kennedy, writing the controlling concurring opinion, de-
veloped what has been dubbed the “significant nexus” test,51 finding 
that  
wetlands possess the requisite nexus . . . if [they], either alone or in com-
bination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more 
readily understood as “navigable.”  When, in contrast, wetlands’ effects on 
water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly 
encompassed by the statutory term “navigable waters.”
52
   
Justice Kennedy determined, with little analysis, that his interpretation 
did not raise Commerce Clause concerns,53 and Justice Scalia noted that 
the Corps’s interpretation of its authority “deliberately sought to ex-
tend the definition of ‘the waters of the United States’ to the outer 
limits of Congress’s commerce power” without further exploring Com-
merce Clause issues implicated by his test.54   
The case immediately sparked controversy, with critics highlighting 
both the bitter partisan divisions among the Justices and the Court’s 
failure to announce one coherent standard.55  Critics objected that the 
ruling “inject[ed] . . . further confusion” into the area of wetlands pro-
tection, imposing higher burdens for both the Corps and property 
 
49 Id. at 742.   
50 Id. (alteration in original).  
51 See id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (recommending “re-
mand for consideration whether the specific wetlands at issue possess a significant nex-
us with navigable waters”).  
52 Id. at 780.   
53 See id. at 782.   
54 Id. at 724 (plurality opinion) (citing Permits for Discharge of Dredged or Fill Ma-
terial into Waters of the United States, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,144, 37,144 n.2 ( July 19, 1977)).   
55 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Divided on Protections over Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, June 
20, 2006, at A1 (describing the case as a “major internal battle that undercut any image 
of good fellowship and unanimity on the Roberts court”).   
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owners in determining ex ante whether they must comply with the 
Corps’s bureaucratic permitting requirements.56  As discussed in Part 
IV, these limits on the Corps’s jurisdiction are judicially derived, judi-
cially reasoned, and judicially imposed.  In struggling to apply these 
limits, the Corps has been forced to move further away from scientific 
determinations and focus instead on a legalistic definition of wetlands.  
The full extent of the fallout from Rapanos remains to be seen, but it 
has fundamentally redefined the scope of and basis for wetlands pro-
tection nationwide.   
B.  Legislative Pushback:  Congress and “Waters of the United States” 
When Congress enacted the CWA in 1972, it included the language 
“waters of the United States.”57  However, congressional expectations 
about the precise meaning of this language were “vague.”58  This broad 
language and the legislative history evince Congress’s deeper purpose 
to protect the “chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the na-
tion’s water.”59  In 1977, Congress further amended the CWA to reflect 
the growing commitment to a broad definition of jurisdictional wa-
ters.60  While the specific breadth of the Corps’s ultimate interpreta-
tion of its own jurisdiction in Rapanos was probably not contemplated 
by the drafters of the Act in 1972, Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn 
 
56 See Latham, supra note 2, at 6.  Other commentators supported the ruling as im-
posing meaningful limits on regulatory action.  See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Once More, 
With Feeling:  Reaffirming the Limits of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction (“To recognize and  
enforce limits on federal regulatory power is not to deny the importance of environ-
mental conservation or the interconnected nature of ecological concerns.”), in THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT, supra note 2, at 81, 81-82. 
57 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
86 Stat. 816.   
58 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:  THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 267 (2010).   
59 H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 71 (1972); see also id. at 131 (“The Committee fully in-
tends that the term ‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional 
interpretation.”); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 (1971) (criticizing the 1965 version of the 
Act as being “severely limited” by its “narrow interpretation of the definition of inter-
state waters”). 
60 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566; see also ESKRIDGE & 
FEREJOHN, supra note 58, at 273-74 (discussing the various political developments that 
led to the passage of the 1977 amendments).   
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point out that a confluence of factors in the intervening years would 
justify such an interpretation:    
If you combine Congress’s broad statutory language (“waters of the United 
States”) plus the congressional purpose of preventing and reversing the 
degradation of the nation’s aquatic ecosystem plus this scientific under-
standing of the critical role played by even “isolated” wetlands in that eco-
system, then the Rapanos property begins to sound like something that 
should be regulated under the act.  Congress did not say in 1972 that it 
wanted to slow down the transformation of wetlands to make way for 
shopping centers.  What legislator would stand up to shopping center de-
velopment?  But the logic of the statute, when understood from a science 
perspective, suggests precisely that.
61   
Examining the behavior of the courts, Congress, and the agencies 
together, Eskridge and Ferejohn conclude that “the only predictable 
result is dynamic interpretation” and “that this dynamic, purposive, 
institutionally interactive process is typical for any statute that has an 
important effect in our society.”62  Under this analysis, the agencies’ 
decision to stretch their authority to the outer bounds of the Com-
merce Clause is in accord with the broader underlying purpose of the 
implementing statute—to enforce the “crazy quilt”63 of wetlands law to 
the best of their ability in order to accommodate the actual congres-
sional purpose in enacting the CWA.  This view of the legislative history 
justifies the Corps’s broad interpretation of their own jurisdiction:  
holistically evaluating all the information available to the Corps, this 
reading comports best with the purpose of the CWA as a whole.   
In response to the Rapanos decision, Congress introduced the Clean 
Water Restoration Act (CWRA), designed, in part, “to provide protec-
tion to the waters of the United States to the maximum extent of the 
legislative authority of Congress under the Constitution.”64  The bill 
specifically redefined “waters of the United States” to reach a broader 
set of waters, including traditionally navigable waters as well as “all . . . 
mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, [and] wet 
meadows” regardless of their relationship to or effect on traditional nav-
igable waters.65  The CWRA also clarified that this definition applied 
 
61 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 58, at 272.   
62 Id. at 276.   
63 Id.   
64 S. 787, 111th Cong. § 2(3) (2009).   
65 Id. § 4(3).   
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“to the fullest extent that these waters, or activities affecting these wa-
ters, are subject to the legislative power of Congress under the Consti-
tution.”66  Faced with the Court’s retrenchment on the scope of the 
Corps’s jurisdiction, Congress responded with a proposal that would 
have further expanded the Corps’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause, making clear their commitment to asserting jurisdiction over 
the widest range of wetlands constitutionally permissible.   
The bill failed to make it out of the Senate, but Congress’s  
response is notable both for its timing and for its defeat.67  First, the 
bill arose immediately after a controversial Supreme Court decision; 
Congress did not feel compelled to act until the judiciary stepped in 
and attempted to retract agency authority, indicating at least tacit  
acceptance of the Corps’s prior, expansive view of its jurisdiction  
under the CWA.68  Second, the bill never made it out of committee in 
the Senate, so it was not possible to assemble enough political support 
to send a clear message to the Court and the agencies that the Corps 
should maximize its authority.  Applying Eskridge and Ferejohn’s con-
ception, however, reframes this legislative response to Rapanos as Con-
gress’s attempt to reinforce continued support for a definition of 
“waters of the United States” that is broad enough to reach the outer 
bounds of the Constitution.  The congressional debate over the pro-
posed CWRA, Congress’s prior articulated purpose of protecting the 
waters of the United States, and the dynamic definition of wetlands 
indicate a legislative intent to implement the CWA as expansively as 
 
66 Id.   
67 See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, Despite Changes,  
Water Bill Faces Certain Demise in the Senate ( June 18, 2009), available at http:// 
epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Minority.PressReleases&ContentRecord
_id=f46bd9b7-802a-23ad-4183-baae0d6d5fad&Region_id=&Issue_id (reporting that the 
bill was stalled indefinitely due to opposition from some senators over what they per-
ceived to be “regulatory overreach”).   
68 The legislature’s failure to act in the years prior to the Rapanos decision also 
compels this conclusion, although the Court has been unwilling to accept failure to act 
as evidence of congressional acceptance of a particular policy.  See, e.g., Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (“It is impossible to assert with any degree of assur-
ance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative congressional approval of 
the Court’s statutory interpretation.” (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 
U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989))).   
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possible.69  The CWRA, in spite of its failure, is merely another factor 
that should lead the Corps to implement its CWA mandate broadly.   
These hurdles illuminate the problems with relying on Congress to 
push back against judicial redefinition of legislative intent.  Whose in-
terpretation of the outer limits of the Commerce Clause—the Supreme 
Court’s, Congress’s, or the Executive’s—should be given primacy? 70 
C.  Executive Interpretation 
The SWANCC and Rapanos era of wetlands jurisdiction has coincided 
with the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama.  In a 2004 
Earth Day speech, President Bush discussed wetlands protection and 
committed his administration to go beyond a policy of no net loss to a 
policy of “an overall increase of Americans’ wetlands over the next 5 
years.”71  The Bush Administration continued this initiative throughout 
both terms, setting annual goals for wetlands restoration and creating 
programs to achieve protection in specific high-risk areas such as the  
Everglades.72   
Despite President Bush’s 2004 proclamation that wetlands are “vital 
to the health of our environment,”73 the Bush Administration’s guide-
lines issued in response to Rapanos were widely criticized by environ-
mental groups.74  A draft of the guidelines had been completed in Sep-
tember 2006 and a leaked copy of the draft version appeared to give 
 
69 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 58, at 272; see also infra Section IV.A.   
70 For an explanation of how the current paradigm, which relies on the Supreme 
Court’s definition as paramount, undermines agency implementation of congressional 
will and infringes on Congress’s power to delegate constitutional interpretation to 
agencies, see infra Part VI. 
71 Remarks on Earth Day in Wells, Maine, 1 PUB. PAPERS 649, 651 (Apr. 22, 2004).  
Bush was referring to the “no net loss” policy the Corps implemented in 1989, which 
required “compensatory mitigation” at a ratio greater than 2:1 to offset any wetlands 
loss caused by permitted action.  U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
FOR RAPANOS AND CARABELL DECISION 5 ( June 5, 2007), available at http://www. 
usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/regulatory/cwa_guide/rapanos_qa_06-05-
07.pdf. 
72 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 71, at 5-6. 
73 Remarks on Earth Day in Wells, Maine, supra note 71, at 651.   
74 See, e.g., John M. Broder, After Concerted Lobbying, Rules Governing Wetlands Are Nar-
rowed, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2007, at A13 (reporting hostile reactions to the 2007 draft 
guidance from environmental groups such as the Sierra Club, based partly on per-
ceived lobbyist influence).  
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officials broad power to assert jurisdiction, placing millions of acres off 
limits to industry.75  However, the final guidelines, released in June 
2007,76 interpreted the Rapanos tests far more narrowly.77  Environmen-
tal groups used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain communi-
cations between the White House Council on Environmental Quality 
and industry insiders, and claimed that the changes between the draft 
and final versions of the guidelines were the result of lobbyist influ-
ence.78  The White House denied that lobbyists exerted improper pres-
sure, instead arguing that Justice Kennedy’s open-ended language, 
coupled with bureaucratic drafting requirements, had rendered the 
process frustratingly slow.79 
In his presidential campaign materials, then-Senator Barack Obama 
committed to preserving wetlands through existing federal legislation, 
new programs developed with local government officials, and coopera-
tion with private landowners.80  These materials do not set forth any 
specific goals for wetlands preservation, and so far the Obama Admin-
istration has not significantly altered the Bush Administration guide-
lines or wetlands policy.  It has, however, committed to wetlands 
restoration as part of cleanup efforts after the BP Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill in the Gulf Coast.81  In 2009, the Obama Administration sent a 
letter to House and Senate leaders outlining broad principles for legis-
lation clarifying the scope of the Act, including consistency, predicta-
bility, and waterway protection.82  As discussed above, however, the 
 
75 Id.   
76 Id.   
77 See infra Section IV.B.   
78 Broder, supra note 74.   
79 See id.  For a more detailed discussion of the Guidance, see infra Section IV.B.  
80 See OBAMA BIDEN, BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN:  PROMOTING A HEALTHY  
ENVIRONMENT, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20110203041207/http://www. 
barackobama.com/pdf/issues/EnvironmentFactSheet.pdf (accessed via the Internet 
Archive). 
81 See Exec. Order No. 13,554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,313 (Oct. 8, 2010) (establishing the 
“Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force”).   
82 See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33483, WETLANDS:  AN OVER-
VIEW OF ISSUES 12 (2012) (discussing the letter and the principles it outlined); Press 
Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, Boxer Welcomes Obama Admin-
istration Letter on Need for Clean Water Act Legislation (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Majority.PressReleases&Content
Record_id=64739ae3-802a-23ad-4c30-36fc58cc1014&Region_id=&Issue_id=.   
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legislation resulting from this recommendation—the Clean Water Res-
toration Act—never made it out of the Senate.83   
Thus, the agencies are seemingly faced with a congressional man-
date to exert their jurisdiction as broadly as possible, two conflicting 
legal doctrines that purport to explain just how broad that jurisdiction 
really is, and executive oversight that seems to have shifted from a nar-
row interpretation to a broader one, while failing to provide any signifi-
cant guidance.  The next Part addresses how the agencies have 
responded generally to these conflicting authorities and then exam-
ines their reactions more narrowly through the lens of the Corps’s  
determination of its own jurisdiction.     
IV.  AGENCY INTERPRETATION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” 
This Part analyzes the agencies’ response to the Rapanos decision in 
detail by focusing on the publication of a Guidance document in 2007 
and its subsequent modifications.  First, I set out a brief overview of the 
sources of agency statutory interpretation, relying on the work of Pro-
fessor Jerry Mashaw to reveal what sources agencies do, and should, 
rely upon in performing their interpretative function.  I then contrast 
these sources and procedures with those used by courts.   
Second, I summarize the agencies’ response to the Rapanos decision, 
chronicling their release and subsequent modifications of a nonbind-
ing Guidance document.  As this brief overview will show, the result 
has been to add a considerable amount of complexity to the already 
cumbersome process through which the agencies assert their jurisdic-
tion.  Part V explores this backdrop of procedural complexity further 
and uses individual jurisdictional determinations to examine the 
agencies’ on-the-ground implementation of the procedures set forth 
in the Guidance documents. 
A.  Canons of Agency Interpretation 
Agencies and courts are designed to accomplish different ends, to 
use different procedures in making decisions, and to capitalize on 
their relative strengths to best fulfill their purposes.  Jerry Mashaw’s 
work on agency statutory interpretation is a useful framework for con-
 
83 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.   
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sidering these issues.  He has argued that agencies do, and should, fol-
low techniques of statutory interpretation that are different from those 
that judges employ.84  More specifically, Mashaw argues that agencies 
should be instrumental rather than hidebound; they should use stat-
utes to accomplish a particular purpose rather than feel they are tied 
directly to the statutory text.85  He also recommends that agencies look 
to various legislative materials—beyond original legislative history—
while judges should be more wary of these sources.86  Agencies should 
be encouraged to adapt and modify their interpretations of statutes to 
reflect changing societal attitudes, political or presidential will, or  
recent scientific developments in a way that courts are not.87  The Chev-
ron Court itself acknowledged this freedom from stare decisis when it 
recognized that agencies act—and should act—differently from judges 
when engaging in statutory interpretation.88  Justice Stevens, writing 
for the Court in Chevron, explicitly recognized that this difference is 
necessary to reflect different institutional competencies, since judges 
are ill-equipped to make the types of policy judgments agencies rou-
tinely perform.89 
These principles of agency statutory interpretation reflect funda-
mental differences in the respective constitutional positions and insti-
tutional competencies of agencies and courts.  Eskridge and Ferejohn 
take this concept one step further, arguing that when agency person-
nel must interpret “superstatutes”—or cross-cutting statutes like the 
CWA—they often behave like judges interpreting the Constitution, by 
extrapolating a broader purpose from the statute based on a variety of 
 
84 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference:  A Preliminary  
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 524-36 (2005).   
85 See id. at 516-21 (emphasizing that agencies, like courts, should take into account 
“prudential considerations”).   
86 See id. at 511-13 (arguing that for agencies, unlike courts, it is “precisely their job as 
agents of past congresses and sitting politicians to synthesize the past with the present”). 
87 See id. at 513 (arguing that agencies should use “an interpretive approach that 
engages in a wider ranging set of policy considerations and a more straightforward 
attention to political context than would be constitutionally appropriate for judges”).   
88 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 
(1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.  On the contrary, 
the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations 
and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”).   
89 Id. at 865-66. 
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sources, and then acting based on that broader purpose.90  They con-
tend that this deviation is permissible, and even preferable, as it is  
“easier for the governmental process to override the agency” than it is 
to override the courts because all three branches retain some oversight 
powers over agency action.91  Unlike the judiciary, agencies are account-
able to all three branches of government, as well as to the broader 
constituency of the American people.92 
Thus, agencies and courts approach interpretation—both statutory 
and constitutional—in fundamentally different ways.  Judges are con-
cerned with a narrow set of facts, or with an issue framed by adversarial 
parties, and they seek a remedy to resolve a particular case or contro-
versy.  Agencies, by contrast, implement statutes in accord with a broad 
underlying purpose, coordinate their responses dynamically and flexi-
bly, and act as stewards of legislative intent in the face of shifting pres-
idential will and dynamic science.  There is a place for both methodol-
ogies in our constitutional structure, and both provide mechanisms for 
creating and interpreting constitutional norms.93  The differences  
between them are necessary to accommodate different institutional 
competencies and to ensure that agencies possess the flexibility to 
freely implement their underlying statutes and respond to scientific 
developments.   
To illustrate these principles in practice, the following discussion 
examines how the EPA and the Corps responded to the Court’s con-
fusing holding in Rapanos.  
 
90 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 58, at 292-93.  While Professor Eskridge and I 
draw different conclusions on judicial deference based on this information, I agree 
with his larger points relating to institutional competence and the active role of agen-
cies in defining and policing the outer bounds of the Constitution.  Compare Eskridge & 
Baer, supra note 23, at 1171-75 (discussing the relative institutional competence of 
judges and agencies), with infra Part VI (discussing my own theory regarding agency 
expertise and constitutional interpretation).   
91 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 58, at 293.   
92 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (noting that federal judges, unlike agencies and 
Congress, have no constituency); id. at 865 (“While agencies are not directly account-
able to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political 
branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .”).   
93 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 58, at 6-9 (describing the process of form-
ing constitutional norms through administrative and legislative deliberation).   
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B.  The Guidance:  Procedural and Substantive 
In August 2006, the Chief of the Corps’s Environmental Advisory 
Board, Kenneth Babcock, sent a letter to the Corps’s Chief Engineer 
expressing concern that the Rapanos decision might be construed “as a 
call to remove protection from the extensive wetlands of the US with-
out a permanent surface water connection to navigable streams.”94  
Babcock urged the Corps to proceed through interpretive guidance, 
rather than rulemaking, in order to minimize inconsistency and avoid 
uncertainty while retaining flexibility and freedom to experiment with 
new solutions.95  In June 2007, the EPA and the Corps heeded his call 
and issued a reaction to Rapanos through interpretive guidance (the 
Guidance) instead of notice-and-comment rulemaking.96  This decision 
 
94 Letter from Kenneth M. Babcock, Chairman, Envtl. Advisory Bd., to Lt. Gen. 
Carl A. Strock, Chief of Eng’rs, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 1 (Aug. 11, 2006), available  
at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/Environmental/rapanos-carabell_8-11-
06ltr.pdf.    
95 Id. at 2.  Proceeding through informal mechanisms, such as this interpretative 
guidance, has become the norm for administrative agencies as notice-and-comment 
rulemaking has become more costly.  See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossi-
fying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1390-92 (1992) (describing agency in-
centives to let existing rules “ossify” instead of modifying them given the high resource 
costs required to alter the status quo); see also STEPHEN G. BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 730-37 (5th ed. 2002) (discussing the ossification 
thesis and external influences, including judicial review and oversight, as chilling agen-
cies’ ability to regulate).  Professor McGarity suggests that all three branches should 
“back off” from agencies, allowing the regulatory state to “function with greater free-
dom and flexibility.”  McGarity, supra, at 1462.  Scholars who have subjected this ossifi-
cation thesis to empirical review, however, have indicated that the problem may not be 
as widespread as initially feared.  See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Empirical Evidence and Admin-
istrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1127-31 (suggesting that available evidence on 
judicial review of rulemaking does not support the ossification thesis, but calling for 
further research); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification 
Thesis:  An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 108, 153-64), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract_id=1699878 (examining rules promulgated by the Department of the 
Interior, finding “mixed and relatively weak evidence” that ossification is a serious and 
widespread problem, supporting the conclusion that rules take longer to develop now 
than in the past, and determining that agencies have not turned to “more informal 
policy devices as substitutes for notice-and-comment rulemaking”). 
96 See EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOW-
ING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES & CARABELL V. 
UNITED STATES (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/CWA_ 
Jurisdiction_Following_Rapanos120208.pdf (updating the original guidelines from June 
5, 2007 and identifying the waters over which the EPA and Corps will and will not assert 
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meant that the agencies were not subject to the dense procedural re-
quirements regarding informal rulemaking imposed by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, but could proceed via nonbinding interpretation 
with room for flexibility.97 
Substantively, the Guidance attempted to harmonize the plurality 
and Kennedy tests, asserting relatively automatic jurisdiction over tra-
ditionally navigable waterways (TNWs), wetlands adjacent to TNWs, 
and nonnavigable tributaries that meet the plurality’s “relatively per-
manent” test (i.e., relatively permanent waterways, or RPWs), and wet-
lands adjacent to RPWs.98  The Guidance incorporated the Kennedy 
test by directing the agencies to perform a “fact-specific analysis” to 
determine if there is a significant nexus with a TNW for nonnavigable 
tributaries that are “not relatively permanent,” wetlands adjacent to 
those tributaries, and wetlands “adjacent to but that do not directly 
abut a relatively permanent non-navigable tributary.”99  This significant 
nexus analysis directs the agencies to consider the “chemical, physical 
and biological integrity of downstream traditional navigable waters.”100  
In a question-and-answer document accompanying the Guidance, the 
 
jurisdiction following Rapanos).  The agencies had been close to releasing guidelines in 
September 2006, but those guidelines were pulled back at the last minute.  See Broder, 
supra note 74.  Environmental groups, after examining a leaked version of the earlier 
2006 guidelines, claimed that subtle differences made it easier to evade permitting 
requirements under the released 2007 version, which was allegedly influenced by polit-
ical lobbyists.  Id.; see also supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (detailing the Bush 
administration’s response to allegations that changes in the guidelines were influenced 
by lobbyist pressure).   
97 See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006) (excepting 
“interpretative rules” and “general statements of policy” from notice-and-comment 
requirements).  This loophole has been widely criticized for decades, as scholars chal-
lenge the transparency and legitimacy of lawmaking not subject to APA regulation.  See 
Robert A. Anthony, “Well, You Want the Permit, Don’t You?”  Agency Efforts to Make Nonleg-
islative Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 39-40 (1992) (arguing that the 
APA should be interpreted to require agencies to proceed through binding rule-
makings under § 553 in some circumstances, such as when an agency asserts jurisdic-
tion in a new area where it does not have obvious authority); James Hunnicutt, Note, 
Another Reason to Reform the Federal Regulatory System:  Agencies’ Treating Nonlegislative Rules 
as Binding Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 153, 155 (2000) (“[B]y treating nonlegislative rules as 
binding law, agencies undermine the APA’s propitious objectives of clarity, uniformity 
and public participation.”).   
98 EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 96, at 1.   
99 Id.   
100 Id.   
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agencies urged that their purpose in drafting the Guidance was to 
“promot[e] clarity and consistent application of legal mandates enun-
ciated in the Rapanos decision,” but conceded that “some ephemeral 
tributaries and their adjacent wetlands will not be jurisdictional under 
the CWA.”101   
The new Guidance also added additional procedural layers, requir-
ing administrative recording and web publication of jurisdictional  
determinations (JDs).102  Corps districts are required to submit copies of 
completed JDs to headquarters for review prior to asserting or denying 
jurisdiction,103 and the EPA has the ability to “elevate” such JDs to an 
EPA Regional Administrator or to Corps headquarters if there is signif-
icant disagreement over the findings.104  The agencies acknowledge 
that these new requirements, both substantive and procedural, will 
result in an increased “workload for field staff as they document and 
make significan[t] nexus determinations.”105  To manage this antici-
pated increase, the agencies recommend that applicants shoulder the 
burden themselves by hiring independent consultants to “help per-
form” the JDs.106  In addition to imposing additional costs on the regu-
lated parties, this expectation erodes the independence of JDs, inviting 
external and potentially biased expert assessments into the process.  
While JDs are envisioned as agency determinations, the required par-
ticipation of paid third parties potentially subjects the assessments to 
industry capture.   
The agencies opened the Guidance for public comment on June 5, 
2007, and extended the comment period until January 21, 2008.107  In 
 
101 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 71, at 6, 11.   
102 Id. at 12.   
103 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, GUIDANCE HIGHLIGHTS FOR RAPANOS AND CARABELL 
DECISION 1 (2007), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/ 
regulatory/cwa_guide/guidhigh_06-05-07.pdf. 
104 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 71, at 12.   
105 Id. at 14.   
106 Id. at 16.  Districts support this fee-shifting to the regulated community and 
agree to accept the workload for “mom and pop” requests, but they encourage large 
real estate developers to hire independent environmental consultants to assist with the 
“labor-intensive” delineation process.  See, e.g., Jurisdictional Determinations, U.S. ARMY 
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PHILA. DISTRICT, http://www.nap.usace.army.mil/cenap-op/ 
regulatory/jurisdet.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).   
107 EPA and Army Corps of Engineers Guidance Regarding Clean Water Act Juris-
diction After Rapanos, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,304 (Nov. 28, 2007).   
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December 2008, after receiving 66,047 public comments, the agencies 
issued an updated Guidance reflecting only a few relatively minor 
changes.108  The comments addressed four substantive areas:  interpre-
tation of the term “significant nexus,” the treatment of tributaries, the 
definition of RPWs, and the scope of TNWs.109  Generally, conserva-
tionists and environmental groups complained that the new Guidance 
interpreted “significant nexus” and the other terms too narrowly, argu-
ing that the agencies should consider all waterways within a particular 
watershed to be jurisdictional.110  The regulated community, on the 
other hand, argued that the agencies were still stretching their juris-
diction too far.111  The agencies issued perfunctory responses to these 
substantive comments, explaining that they had already considered 
most of the positions expressed and had “struck a careful balance 
when interpreting the Rapanos opinions.”112 
Environmentalists and industry commentators united to take issue 
with the delay in processing JDs and the complicated coordination  
between agencies.113  The agencies responded to these criticisms by 
shortening the EPA’s review time and by citing a Regulatory Guidance 
Letter clarifying the procedure for the issuance of preliminary JDs.114  
The preliminary JD process empowers the Corps to issue an initial, 
nonbinding JD, allowing the permitting process to proceed without 
forcing a party to wait for a formal JD.  However, these preliminary JDs 
should not be relied upon and are not subject to appeal.115  Finally, the 
 
108 See EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS REGARDING  
THE REVISED RAPANOS & CARABELL GUIDANCE 1-2 (2008), available at http:// 
www.sas.usace.army.mil/regulatory/documents/RapanosRevisedGuidanceQandAs.pdf 
(noting that the Revised Guidance clarifies the terms “traditional navigable waters,” 
“adjacent wetlands,” and “relevant reach”).   
109 EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, RESPONSE TO COMMENTS:  “CLEAN WATER ACT 
JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES & 
CARABELL V. UNITED STATES GUIDANCE” ISSUED JUNE 5, 2007, at 1 (2008), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2008_12_3_wetlands_Com
ments_Response_120208.pdf.   
110 Id. at 2.  
111 Id. 
112 EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 108, at 2. 
113 Id.   
114 Id. at 5-6. 
115 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, REGULATORY GUIDANCE LETTER NO. 08-02, at 3 
(2008), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/RGLS/rgl08- 
02.pdf (citing 33 C.F.R. § 331.2 (2007)).   
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agencies reiterated their commitment to proceeding through flexible 
informal guidance instead of rigid rules in order to “gain experience” 
with the new regime.116  
In addition to these relatively straightforward, if controversial, inter-
pretative guidance documents, the Corps also publishes a comprehen-
sive “Instructional Guidebook” to performing JDs.117  This sixty-page 
handbook, with multiple appendices, walks Corps engineers through 
each portion of the Approved JD Form and includes analysis of multi-
ple examples of watershed areas and their appropriate JD verdicts.118  
Significantly, the Guidebook depicts the jurisdictional analysis—both 
procedural and substantive—as a series of complicated flowcharts.119  
These flowcharts explain what is, even by federal agency standards, an 
incredibly complicated series of steps to determine whether a particu-
lar body of water is isolated (implicating that the Corps does not have 
jurisdiction), subject to significant nexus analysis (implicating that an 
additional procedural flowchart must be consulted), or adjacent to 
traditionally navigable or relatively permanent waters (implicating that 
the plurality test should be applied).120  These three substantive 
flowcharts are followed by three even more complicated procedural 
flowcharts, illustrating the processes for intra- and interagency coordi-
nation for significant nexus evaluations, isolated waters, and approved 
JDs not linked to a permit application.121   
The ultimate purpose is for engineers issuing JDs to determine 
whether they can issue a JD under their own authority, or whether the 
district requires approval from headquarters, an EPA regional office, or 
some other player in the decisionmaking process.122  These materials 
were modified in the aftermath of the Rapanos decision and the EPA 
Guidance in order to reflect the agencies’ policy decisions on how to 
incorporate the plurality and Kennedy tests, adding the agencies’ 
 
116
 EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 109, at 3.   
117 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION FORM INSTRUC-
TIONAL GUIDEBOOK (2007), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/ 
civilworks/regulatory/cwa_guide/jd_guidebook_051207final.pdf.    
118 Id. at 17-39, 49-60. 
119 See id. at 8-13. 
120 Id. at 8-10. 
121 Id. at 11-13. 
122 Id. 
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treatment of both tests as well as the procedural and consultation  
requirements between the agencies.123   
These charts represent a strange collision of court doctrine and the 
scientific method, and reveal the limitations when an agency com-
prised of engineers—experts in assessing geologic, chemical, and phys-
ical characteristics of wetlands—attempts to incorporate a judge-made 
doctrine into its everyday decisionmaking process.  The results, with 
more than fifteen boxes in one flowchart alone, are decidedly clunky.124 
V.  IMPLEMENTING THE GUIDANCE:  A CASE STUDY OF  
JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATIONS 
Has the Army Corps been able to effectuate the JD process in the 
face of the new restrictions imposed by Rapanos, as interpreted by the 
agencies?  Industry critics tend to focus on the agencies’ failure to  
resolve contentious questions; as two industry advisors commented, 
“[t]he regulated community and the courts are left in no better a posi-
tion with the Guidance than they were pre-Rapanos.”125  Yet there have 
been relatively few analyses, critical or favorable, of the Guidance’s 
effect on internal agency procedures.126   
 
123 See id. at 6-7, 16 (summarizing Rapanos and explaining its influence on JD poli-
cies and procedure).  
124 See id. at 13.   
125 Bruce S. Flushman & Wendy L. Manley, Post-Rapanos Guidance from EPA:  “You Fig-
ure it Out,” WENDEL ROSEN BLACK & DEAN LLP ( June 2007), http://www.wendel.com/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=content.contentDetail&id=8855. 
126 For one of the few studies on the Guidance’s influence, see Kenneth S. Gould, 
Drowning in Wetlands Jurisdictional Determination Process:  Implementation of Rapanos v. 
United States, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 413 (2008).  Gould found that after Ra-
panos, the JD process suffers from the imposition of additional costs and delay and the 
“abandonment of the established methods of science for the contrived process imposed 
by the Supreme Court.”  Id. at 440-49.  Anecdotal evidence supports Gould’s assessment 
of the effects of the Guidance document, as industry insiders have complained about 
procedural density and delay.  See Comment of Raymond R. Ashcraft, Jr., Manager, 
Envtl. Affairs & Permitting, AllianceCoal, LLC, Doc. ID EPA-HQ-OW-2007-0282-0244 
( Jan. 22, 2008) (“We are extremely concerned that the Rapanos Guidance sets forth 
cumbersome, inefficient and time-consuming procedures that will invariably cause 
further confusions and costly delays in the CWA permitting program.”), in response to 
Request for Comment, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,304 (Nov. 28, 2007).  Other scholarship has 
been critical of the agencies’ response to Rapanos.  Focusing on the 2007 Guidance 
document, scholars have argued that it only confuses the issue and have recommended 
that the agencies promulgate new regulations through notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing.  See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes:  The 
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To answer these questions, I examined a sample of JDs from a variety 
of types of wetlands.127  The central Corps website has posted thirty JDs, 
which are classified by geographic feature and offer representative  
examples of how Corps engineers are performing their new role as 
enforcers of the Rapanos doctrines.128  The key takeaway from my study 
is that the Rapanos decision has forced the agencies to reason more 
like courts, concurrently applying legal tests and scientific analysis in an 
interesting and rather puzzling phenomenon I dub “scientificolegal” 
reasoning.  This has forced the Corps—an organization designed to 
operate based on scientific expertise—to conform its decisionmaking 
to legal tests established by Justices with little sense of how their judi-
cial standards would play out in the real world.   
To show the evolution and effects of this phenomenon, I start with 
a discussion of how the JD process works and how it differs procedurally 
from judicial decisionmaking.  JDs, unlike judicial opinions, have lim-
ited precedential value and are authored by scientific, as opposed to 
legal, experts.  Next, I explore the effects of the Rapanos test on the 
Corps’s JD analysis by examining specific examples of JDs.  I conclude 
that the changes brought on by Rapanos undermine the JDs’ nonjudi-
cial characteristics and that the Corps’s new scientificolegal methodol-
ogy represents a paradigm shift in the Corps’s procedures that forces 
 
Deference Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 EMORY L.J. 1, 66-67 (2011) (recom-
mending that the EPA and the Corps issue new regulations on the meaning of “waters 
of the United States” via notice and comment in order to increase the likelihood of 
receiving Chevron deference); Gregory H. Morrison, Comment, A Nexus of Confusion:  
Why the Agencies Responsible for Clean Water Act Enforcement Should Promulgate a New Set of 
Rules Governing the Act’s Jurisdiction, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 397, 409-11, 413-17 (2011) 
(discussing the criticism that the Guidance fails to correctly interpret the Court’s opinion 
and recommending the adoption of narrower regulations that better account for the 
plurality and significant nexus tests).   
127 The Corps publishes JDs to comply with its public transparency requirements.  
Each district is obligated to publish all of its approved JDs on its local website.  See U.S. 
ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 115, at 6.  However, some district offices have yet to 
achieve in practice what their regulations contemplate in theory.   
128 The website dubs these samples “HQ Field Memos Implementing the Rapanos 
Guidance.”  CWA Guidance, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENGINEERS, http://www.usace.army.mil/ 
Missions/CivilWorks/RegulatoryProgramandPermits/RelatedResources/CWAGuidance 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2011).  Additional samples are available from local district websites.  
See id. (follow “Division and District JD Forms Links” hyperlink) (cataloguing links  
to district websites); see also, e.g., Jurisdictional Determination Information Sheets, U.S.  
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PHILA. DISTRICT, http://www.nap.usace.army.mil/cenap-
op/regulatory/jdis.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012) (listing approved JDs for the district).   
Brader_FINAL.doc (DO NOT DELETE)  4/17/2012 2:52 PM 
2012] Toward a Constitutional Chevron 1507 
 
agency personnel selected and trained for their scientific expertise to 
engage in a sort of quasi-jurisprudence.   
A.  An Overview of Jurisdictional Determinations  
and Section 404 Permitting 
The 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act govern the wetlands 
permitting requirements that the Corps has implemented.129  The 
amendments added what is commonly known as section 404 authority, 
which authorizes the Corps to issue permits, after notice and oppor-
tunity for public hearing, for the discharge of “dredged or fill material 
into the navigable waters” of the United States at “specified disposal 
sites.”130  This scheme ensures that developers obtain a permit from the 
Corps before filling wetland areas to facilitate building or farming.  
The statute also confers a procedural and oversight role to the EPA.131   
The Corps primarily issues individual permits,132 which are granted 
unless the district engineer, relying on a variety of factors, determines 
that doing so would be “contrary to the public interest.”133  The Corps 
will provide a JD to any landowner, permit applicant, or “affected party” 
when asked to do so, when jurisdiction is contested, or when the Corps 
determines that jurisdiction does not exist over a particular water body 
or wetland.134 
In practice, procedures vary from district to district, since the Corps 
is a “highly decentralized organization” and “[m]ost of the authority 
for administering the regulatory program has been delegated to the 
thirty-six district engineers and eleven division engineers.”135  When 
making JDs, however, each district must complete a nationally stand-
ardized JD form prior to engaging in the full permitting process in 
 
129 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 
sec. 2, § 404, 86 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006)).  
130 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).   
131 See id. § 1344(b) (requiring the EPA to develop guidelines for the Corps).   
132 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 31 (explaining the Corps’s statutory 
authorization and stating that “[t]he basic form of authorization . . . is the individual 
permit”).  The Corps can also issue “[l]etters of permission” and general permits.  Id.  
133 See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (2011) (enumerating a variety of factors to be considered 
in determining whether a permit would be consistent with the public interest).   
134 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 115, at 1-2.  
135 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(2) (2011).   
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accordance with guidance from Corps headquarters.136  In response to 
Rapanos, this form, as well as the associated Guidance, has been modi-
fied to reflect both the plurality and Kennedy tests.137  
The JD form is not structured to mirror the analysis of a court opin-
ion.  They differ in two important respects:  JDs have only limited 
precedential value, and they are authored by scientific, not legal, ex-
perts.  In general, the requesting party may rely on an approved JD for 
five years and may use it in a CWA citizen’s suit brought to challenge 
the JD’s legitimacy or determination.138  JDs can also be appealed im-
mediately through the Corps’s administrative appeals process.139  The 
precedential effect of a JD on subsequent determinations is limited; in 
some cases, the JD expressly disclaims any applicability to future re-
quests, even for waterways in the same area.140  Likewise, the regula-
tions make clear that appeals of JDs have limited precedential effect:   
Because a decision to determine geographic jurisdiction . . . depends on 
the facts, circumstances, and physical conditions particular to the specific 
project and/or site being evaluated, appeal decisions would be of little or 
no precedential utility.  Therefore, an appeal decision of the division  
engineer is applicable only to the instant appeal, and has no other prece-
dential effect.  Such a decision may not be cited in any other administra-
 
136 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 117, at 7.  
137 See Press Release, EPA, EPA, Army Corps Issue Joint Guidance to Sustain Wet-
lands Protection Under Supreme Court Decision ( June 5, 2007), available at http:// 
yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/01cce72ba7e92d97852572a000658ef5/e7240f5d3 
0236d2b852572f1005e1809!OpenDocument.   
138 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 115, at 2.  
139 Id.  Preliminary JDs, by contrast, are nonbinding and are not appealable.  Id. at 3 
(citing 33 C.F.R. § 331.25(b)).  On appeal, the district engineer’s initial JD decision is 
reviewed by the division engineer.  33 C.F.R. § 331.9(a).  The standard is deferential, 
and the division engineer should overturn a decision only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, not supported by substantial evidence,” or plainly contrary to a 
requirement of law or Corps policy guidance.  Id. § 331.9(b). 
140 See, e.g., Memorandum from the EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs to Decline 
Jurisdiction for LRC-2009-00053 (Aug. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum to Decline 
Jurisdiction for LRC-2009-00053] (on file with author) (emphasizing that the related 
JD is a “case-specific determination . . . that . . . sets no policy or precedent with respect 
to any other situation”); Memorandum from the EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs for 
NWS-2006-82, at 1 n.3 (Dec. 10, 2007) (on file with author) (indicating that the desig-
nation of the nearest traditionally navigable waterway does not bind the agencies in 
future upstream determinations).  
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tive appeal, and may not be used as precedent for the evaluation of any 
other jurisdictional determination . . . .141 
Nevertheless, to ensure “consistency with law, Executive Orders, 
and policy,” the regulations instruct that all appeals decisions be for-
warded to Corps headquarters and subject to periodic review.142  Thus, 
because of the fact-dependent nature of each determination, individual 
JDs bind the parties to the action, but explicitly do not bind the agen-
cies in future cases.  Despite this insistence for case-by-case determina-
tion, the Corps’s Guidebook for JDs includes numerous photographs 
and illustrations designed to represent commonly occurring physical 
features and provide guidance to Corps engineers about when such 
features meet the tests under the agencies’ Rapanos Guidance.143   
There appears to be a contradiction here:  the Corps has pro-
claimed that JDs are too circumstance dependent to be afforded prec-
edential weight and yet enough similarities exist to allow them to 
publish guidance with specific, illustrated examples and a recom-
mended outcome.  This tension indicates that the Corps could assign 
precedential value to JDs but, for other institutional reasons, chooses 
not to.  Presumably, these reasons encompass institutional competency, 
which is often used to justify entrusting decisions to agencies.144  In 
other words, the Corps has explicitly determined that retaining institu-
tional flexibility to proceed based on a broader understanding of con-
stitutional purpose produces better results than relying on inflexible 
precedent.145 
B.  How Rapanos Has Changed the JD Process 
The Rapanos decision, as filtered through the agencies’ Guidance 
documents, has profoundly affected the way the Corps performs and 
publishes JDs.  First, the Corps’s new procedures have undermined the 
flexibility previously afforded by the JDs’ limited precedential value.  
These procedural complexities open the JD process to industry cap-
 
141 33 C.F.R. § 331.7(g). 
142 Id.   
143 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 117, at 17-39.   
144 See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.  
145 The Corps’s decentralized structure further encourages the agency to proceed 
through ad hoc, nonbinding JDs.  See supra note 135 and accompanying text.   
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ture in a new and deeper way.  Second, and more profoundly, the 
Corps has been forced to squash its scientific determinations into a 
rigid rubric of legal analysis, resulting in the uncomfortable graft I call 
scientificolegal reasoning.  This forced legalism has increased adminis-
trative costs, rendered JDs more confusing, and significantly restricted 
the agencies’ ability to perform constitutional interpretation in a way 
that capitalizes on their superior expertise.  The characteristics of 
agencies that make them better than courts at performing this type of 
constitutional interpretation—their scientific knowledge, flexibility, 
institutional memory, and prospective and broad-based policy accom-
modations—have been significantly eroded by the Rapanos decision’s 
forced legalism.  
1.  Procedural Density:  Undermining the Limited  
Precedential Value of JDs 
The new reasoning imposed by the post-Rapanos Guidance has 
modified the procedural mechanisms for issuing JDs and changed the 
precedential weight the Corps affords them.  Both the EPA and the 
Corps are decentralized:  they comprise numerous independent districts 
under the general oversight of one Washington-based headquarters.146  
To combat the complete devolution of policy, Corps headquarters 
promulgates guidance documents to its thirty-six district offices, citing 
consistency and the reduction of uncertainty as primary goals.147  The 
Corps’s success in administering the section 404 permitting program 
over the last thirty years has been due in large part to its ability to pro-
ceed flexibly, to trust the district engineers conducting public interest 
review, and to work with repeat players to experiment with different 
potential standards and methods.  Flexibility and experimentation 
have been at the heart of the Corps’s section 404 “jurisprudence” to 
date, even under the more convoluted and restrictive requirements set 
out in Rapanos.   
 
146 See About EPA, EPA, www.epa.gov/aboutepa/index.html#offices (listing the 
EPA’s ten regional offices); supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
147 See, e.g., Letter from Kenneth Babcock, Chairman, Envtl. Advisory Bd., to Lt. 
Gen. Carl A. Strock, Chief of Eng’rs, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, supra note 94, at 1 
(urging the Corps to issue post-Rapanos guidance that “provides clear direction” and 
“promotes consistency across districts”).   
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Given the Guidance’s requirement of internal agency review for a 
variety of JD scenarios, however, this policy of decentralized control is 
in jeopardy.  As discussed above, each district across the country is now 
required to complete an identical JD form.148  Moreover, an engineer 
completing a JD must now proceed rigidly through the plurality and 
Kennedy tests, applying each legal lens to determine if jurisdiction is 
warranted rather than focusing on the region’s hydrology as a whole.149  
For example, in a JD addressing jurisdiction over two ditches and their 
abutting wetlands in Crook County, Oregon, the Corps progressed 
mechanically through the required tests.150  The agencies’ analysis, as 
evidenced by even a cursory reading of its headings, reads like a 
flowchart:  “Location,” “TNW Determination,” “Jurisdictional Deter-
mination,” “Relatively Permanent Waters,” “Wetlands with a continu-
ous surface connection to RPW,” “Significant Nexus,” “Conclusion.”151   
While one may contend that this structure merely facilitates judicial 
review of agency JDs to ensure compliance with the Rapanos regime, 
this ease of review arguably comes at the expense of the agencies’ abil-
ity to make independent determinations free from the constraints of 
judicial oversight and reasoning.  As noted above, agencies are neither 
designed nor intended to function like courts.  They address more than 
one controversy at a time and have the ability—and the mandate—to 
accommodate broad policy considerations across a wide array of similar, 
yet distinct, factual circumstances.  Forcing this type of broad statutory 
mandate into a rigid framework to facilitate second-guessing by courts 
undermines the agencies’ express decision to proceed through non-
binding, nonprecedential decisionmaking.152 
Moreover, the administrative appeals process takes a significant toll 
on agencies’ human and financial capital.  Undermining the limited 
precedential nature of agency decisions and forcing them into formu-
laic legal tests will cause these costs to escalate.  The agencies expressly 
acknowledge that these increased costs will be shifted not to taxpayers, 
 
148 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
149 See supra Section IV.B.   
150 See Memorandum from the EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs to Assert Jurisdic-
tion for NWP-2007-945 ( Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Memorandum to Assert Jurisdic-
tion for NWP-2007-945] (on file with author).   
151 See id.   
152 See 33 C.F.R. § 331.7(g) (2011) (establishing that Corps decisions on jurisdiction 
and permitting, because of their fact-specific nature, have no precedential value).    
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but to large developers with pockets deep enough to hire environmen-
tal consultants.153  This shift has the potential to further erode agency 
expertise by outsourcing agency determinations to external parties 
who are not accountable to the government in the same way that 
agencies are.  Fears of industry capture are common among critics of 
administrative agencies,154 and the Rapanos decision is apparently forc-
ing the Corps closer to this problematic outcome because it lacks the 
institutional capacity to comply with post-Rapanos procedural de-
mands.  Although the changes in response to Rapanos were designed 
to constrain agency decisionmaking and encourage conformity, in 
practice the modifications may push the agencies to rely more heavily 
on outside parties, thus moving further from the executive control 
contemplated by the Constitution.   
Another negative outcome of the procedural requirements is the in-
creased costs to the Corps of the JD appeals process.  The appeals taken 
thus far have seemingly confused the issue further, as some courts have 
analyzed jurisdiction under both the Kennedy and plurality tests,155 
while others have concluded that the agencies need only satisfy one.156  
When faced with a decision like Rapanos, in which no opinion is clearly 
controlling, the Supreme Court has made clear that lower courts 
should rely on the opinion with the “narrowest” holding.157  The Court 
 
153 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 71, at 16 (suggesting that in order to 
minimize delays, developers should hire consultants to assist with the jurisdictional 
determination and the permit application); see also Comment of Raymond R. Ashcraft, 
Jr., supra note 126, at 12 (describing the regulated community’s concerns about the 
increased costs and delay imposed by updated Guidance documents); supra notes 105-
06 and accompanying text.   
154 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1713-15 (1975) (discussing the “widely accepted” view that “com-
parative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process of agency 
decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests”).  For an overview 
of agency capture literature, see generally Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, 
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda:  Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 167 (1990).   
155 See United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210-13 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding 
that jurisdiction was appropriate under both tests).   
156 See United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
“Corps has jurisdiction over wetlands that satisfy either the plurality or Justice Kenne-
dy’s test”); see also id. at 798-99 (cataloging the decisions of the other circuit courts on 
this issue).   
157 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).  
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has also conceded, however, that it is not “useful” to pursue this “in-
quiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled 
and divided the lower courts.”158  The Sixth Circuit, in 2009, noted that 
Rapanos easily satisfied this “bafflement” requirement and declined to 
choose one test over the other.159  This pervasive confusion among the 
lower courts imposes even steeper costs on regulated parties ex ante, 
requiring further investigation and, potentially, further expenditure 
on independent consultants.    
Not only is the threat of judicial review thus undermining the 
agencies’ choice to proceed through nonprecedential decisions, but 
judicial review itself is adding further confusion to an already muddled 
process.  The confusion at all levels of review emphasizes the fundamen-
tal problem with forcing an agency to act like a court when making 
constitutional decisions:  it undermines the very advantages that led 
Congress to delegate those determinations to an agency in the first 
place.  These added procedural requirements impose costs on agencies, 
courts, regulated parties, and environmental groups, as every stake-
holder must scramble to understand where exactly the Corps will set 
its constitutional boundaries.  Rather than relying on scientific infor-
mation, this new regime prioritizes “legalese,” precedent, and inflexi-
ble ties to past decisions, both agency made and judicial.  Prior to 
Rapanos, the Corps had affirmatively chosen to proceed through non-
precedential, ad hoc determinations and flexible interpretative guid-
ance in order to avoid the structural constraints inherent in judicial 
decisionmaking.  Unfortunately, this choice has been unmade by the 
requirements of Rapanos, rendering the agencies’ procedural burdens 
equivalent to those of a court.     
2.  Scientificolegal Reasoning 
The Rapanos Guidance requires expert agencies to grapple with  
judicially derived tests—confusing enough to baffle judges—each time 
its staff performs a JD.  In this subsection, I explore this combination of 
legal and scientific expertise, a graft I call scientificolegal reasoning.  At 
the most basic level, JDs apply the Rapanos doctrines, filtered through 
 
158 Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994).  
159 Cundiff, 555 F.3d at 208. 
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agency Guidance, to unique sets of facts.160  While in theory wetlands 
should be easy to delineate,161 the JDs indicate that in practice identify-
ing which wetlands are jurisdictional can be complicated.  To cope 
with this difficulty, some Corps’s engineers engage in a thorough, fact-
intensive analysis, often attaching topographic maps to illustrate their 
points.162  Others, however, reach similar conclusions based only on 
perfunctory treatments of the underlying science.163  In general,  
despite the added layer of legal reasoning now required, the Corps 
continues to find that most waterways satisfy either one or both of the 
tests set out in Rapanos and affirmed in the Guidance.164 
Still, district engineers and their supervisors do seem to be impos-
ing the jurisdictional limits set out in SWANCC and Rapanos.  The JDs 
posted by the Corps fall into one of three general categories:  an asser-
tion of jurisdiction, a decision not to assert jurisdiction, or a remand 
from headquarters to reconsider whether an assertion or denial of ju-
risdiction was proper.  The Corps appears to be applying SWANCC’s 
mandate consistently with regard to isolated waters, as the agencies 
 
160 See supra Section V.A. 
161 See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 27, at 81 (“We can identify and map wetlands 
relatively easily, and thus record their losses and gains over time.”).   
162 See, e.g., Memorandum to Assert Jurisdiction for NWP-2007-945, supra note 150 
(engaging in a lengthy analysis of navigability, depth, regularity of flow, and other fac-
tors supporting jurisdiction); Memorandum from EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs to 
Assert Jurisdiction for SPL-2007-261-FBV, at 2-3 (Dec. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Memoran-
dum to Assert Jurisdiction for SPL-2007-261-FBV] (on file with author) (discussing 
peak flow rates, high water marks, hydrologic connections, boat registrations, and other 
factors supporting jurisdiction); Memorandum from EPA for JD SWG-2007-1769, at 5 
( June 13, 2007), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/ 
regulatory/cwa_guide/epa_swg_2007-1769.pdf (including a topographic map along 
with its analysis). 
163 See, e.g., Memorandum to Decline Jurisdiction for LRC-2009-00053, supra note 
140 (declining jurisdiction with little fact-specific discussion and a brief explanation that 
“jurisdiction could not be supported based solely on links to interstate commerce”); 
Memorandum from EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs to Assert Jurisdiction for NWS-
2007-435-NO, at 1-2 (Aug. 29, 2007) (making a determination based primarily on direct 
hydrologic connections and providing few additional facts to support a finding of a 
significant nexus). 
164 The majority of the JDs studied asserted jurisdiction.  But see, e.g., Memorandum 
from EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs to Decline Jurisdiction for POA-2000-1109 
(Apr. 2, 2008) (on file with author) (retracting a prior determination after new infor-
mation was presented showing that the wetlands were not adjacent).   
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denied jurisdiction in all the samples addressing such waters.165  Some 
denials provide conclusory reasoning with little substantiation in the 
record,166 while others are reasoned more thoroughly and include cita-
tions to the Rapanos Guidance and a step-by-step procession through 
its substantive flowchart.167  
In cases where the waterway at issue is not adjacent to a TNW, the 
Corps engages in explicit Commerce Clause analysis.  For example, in a 
JD assessing Bah Lakes in Minnesota, the EPA analyzed its “susceptibil-
ity to interstate and foreign commerce.”168  The EPA decided that Bah 
Lakes is a TNW, based on public access for small watercraft, accessibil-
ity to out-of-state travelers for recreational commercial navigation, and 
its proximity to public roads and a waterfowl preserve.169   
In the more thoroughly reasoned JDs, the parallels to legal opinions 
are striking:  the Corps cites Rapanos and its tests, the Rapanos Guid-
ance, and other authority to justify its scope of review and then applies 
these tests to the underlying scientific evidence.  For example, in a JD 
declining jurisdiction over an isolated wetland, the analysis begins with 
a legal definition:   
EPA and Corps regulations define “waters of the United States” to include 
wetlands adjacent to other covered waters.  Under the regulations, a wet-
land is “adjacent” when it is “bordering, contiguous or neighboring” an-
other water of the U.S.  The Rapanos Guidance states that finding a 
continuous surface connection is not required to establish adjacency un-
der this definition.
170   
The agencies have framed their supposedly scientific analysis with le-
gal interpretation, defining adjacency by directly citing to the binding 
authority of the Rapanos Guidance.  This introduction sets the stage 
 
165  See, e.g., id.   
166 See id. (dispensing with the jurisdictional determination in less than one page).      
167 See, e.g., Memorandum from EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs to Decline Juris-
diction for NWP-2007-617 (Feb. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Memorandum to Decline Juris-
diction for NWP-2007-617], available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/ 
civilworks/regulatory/cwa_guide/NWP-2007-617jm.pdf (declining jurisdiction over a 
“remnant” of an irrigation ditch not adjacent to any traditional navigable waterway and 
with no connection to interstate commerce).   
168 Memorandum from EPA for JD # 2007-04488-EMN, at 2-4 ( Jan. 16, 2008) (on 
file with author). 
169 Id. 
170 Memorandum to Decline Jurisdiction for NWP-2007-617, supra note 167, at 2 
(footnote omitted).   
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for a determination of the wetland’s adjacency to an RPW, which in-
cludes a discussion of its precipitation, water flow, “groundwater re-
charge,” “nutrient/detrital cycling” and “[s]pecies biodiversity.”171   
The JD concludes, “Based on an examination of a combination of 
factors, primarily related to the position in the landscape and other 
physical characteristics of the wetland in relation to the nearest juris-
dictional water, the wetland is not adjacent . . . to Lazy Creek.”172  The 
JD’s structure presents a strange juxtaposition:  the agency lays out the 
clearly stated legal rule at the outset with citations, and manipulates 
the scientific data to conform to that rule.  While both science and law 
are discussed in the same document, the tone and purpose seem 
markedly different in each discussion—the law is simply layered on top 
of the science without any attempt at integration. 
In another JD that approved jurisdiction over two wetlands and 
remanded a third for reconsideration, the Corps employs what any 
good law student would recognize as textbook legal writing:  it states 
the rule, explains it, and then applies the rule to the facts at hand.173  
The Memorandum begins by explaining why the Ochoco Reservoir is a 
TNW, then discusses how the two jurisdictional wetlands proximate to 
it meet the Rapanos plurality test.174  To do so, it analyzes the water flow 
of the ditches that link the relevant wetlands to the Reservoir using 
years of streamflow data, and concludes that the recorded flows qualify 
the ditches as relatively permanent as defined by the Guidance.175   
Because the two wetlands abut these relatively permanent waterways, 
they are jurisdictional.176  The Corps remanded the JD to the district to 
reevaluate a third wetland based on a significant nexus analysis.177   
The waterways described in this JD are clearly part of one larger wa-
tershed, and the reasoning is replete with descriptions of the links be-
tween the reservoir and the surrounding wetlands.178  In other JDs, this 
connection is clearer still, since they are accompanied by aerial photo-
 
171 Id. at 2-3.   
172 Id.   
173 See Memorandum to Assert Jurisdiction for NWP-2007-945, supra note 150, at 1-3.   
174 Id. at 1-4.   
175 Id. at 3-4.   
176 Id. at 5.  
177 Id. at 4-5.   
178 Id. at 1-4.   
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graphs or topographic maps that reveal the interconnected hydrology 
of the underlying watersheds.179  These fairly obvious conclusions, 
however, are obscured to varying degrees by the legal judgments that 
the Corps has been forced to graft onto its determinations.  In the JD 
discussing the Ochoco Reservoir, the agencies write, 
For these reasons, 2 months of continuous flow is considered “seasonal” 
flow at this particular site in this region, and is sufficient to support the RPW 
designation for ditches 1 and 2.  The Rapanos Guidance gave an example 
of waters that have a continuous flow at least seasonally as those waters that 
typically flow three months.  Three months was provided as an example 
and the agencies have flexibility under the guidance to determine what 
seasonally means in a specific case.  In this case, the agencies have deter-
mined that the case-specific facts support the RPW determinations.
180   
Parsing the remainder of the JD indicates that there is substantial evi-
dence for considering the wetlands at issue to be part of a larger water-
shed.  This obvious scientific conclusion, however, is obscured because 
the agencies phrase it in terms of “the guidance,” and what “the guid-
ance” defines as seasonal.  
The JDs also display a kind of arbitrariness in their application of 
legal standards.  The agencies establish that they are assessing whether 
there is a significant nexus.  They define this standard, but then seem 
to ignore it as they examine the underlying hydrology without explain-
ing the principles they are using.  For example, in one JD assessing a 
watershed, the significant nexus standard is defined as follows:   
A watercourse may have a significant nexus with a TNW where it can be 
demonstrated that the subject watercourse alone has the potential to con-
tribute contaminants that would cause the TNW to exceed its water quality 
standards or otherwise degrade water quality of the TNW.  This potential 
occurs when there is both the presence of the contaminants in the sub-
watershed, and sufficient flows to make the likelihood such pollutants will 
reach the TNW and affect its chemical integrity more than speculative[] or 
insubstantial[].
181
 
 
179 See Memorandum from EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs to Re-Evaluate Juris-
diction for NWP-2007-428, at 4 (Feb. 26, 2008), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/ 
Portals/2/docs/civilworks/regulatory/cwa_guide/nwp_2007_428_ jdm.pdf; Memorandum 
from EPA for JD SWG-2007-1769, supra note 162, at 5.   
180 Memorandum to Assert Jurisdiction for NWP-2007-945, supra note 150, at 4. 
181 Memorandum to Assert Jurisdiction for SPL-2007-261-FBV, supra note 162, at 1. 
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Later, the JD applies this test to the underlying watershed, determin-
ing that the nexus between Canyon Lake, a TNW, and Ambris, the wa-
terway at issue, is significant: 
The State’s analysis of relationships between Canyon Lake and its tributar-
ies helps to evaluate whether the nexus from Ambris segment to Canyon 
Lake is significant. . . . The data and modeling analysis supporting the [to-
tal maximum daily loads (TMDLs)] concludes that polluted runoff from 
urban sources (including the lands in the Ambris segment area) substan-
tially contributed to impairment of Canyon Lake by nitrogen and phos-
phorous.  Urban runoff such as that discharged to the Ambris segment is 
estimated to contribute 12-15% of nitrogen loads and 6-12% of phospho-
rous loads to Canyon Lake.  The TMDLs conclude that, particularly under 
wet conditions, sources in the Quail Valley watershed such as agriculture, 
septic systems, and urban areas contribute significant amounts of nutrients 
to Canyon Lake.
182
 
Although the agencies set out a legal standard and purport to apply 
it, there is no necessary connection between the legal word “signifi-
cant” and the scientific facts—in this case percentages of chemical 
loads—that the agencies determine satisfy that standard.  Instead, it 
appears the agencies use a legal standard—in this case, “more than 
speculative[] or insubstantial[]”183—and then simply invent a level of 
pollutant contribution that satisfies that standard.   
Rather than trust the Corps to use its expertise and understanding 
of congressional intent to expand its jurisdiction to the constitutional 
limit it believes to be scientifically and practically feasible, the Rapanos 
decision requires the Corps to force the square peg of scientific data 
into the round hole of judicial doctrine.  This difficult task, along with 
the procedural density imposed by the Guidance, the elimination of 
the agencies’ ability to determine their jurisdiction in a flexible and 
nonprecedential manner, and the overall cost increases, has left the JD 
process divorced from its original purpose.  Instead of paradigmatic 
administrative constitutionalism, where agencies define their bounda-
ries in accord with the broader purpose of their underlying statutes, 
the Rapanos decision forces the agencies to reason and act like courts.  
Such an outcome undermines the relative institutional competencies 
that originally motivated the creation of three separate branches and 
 
182 Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).   
183 Id. at 1.  
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administrative agencies.  To respond to this problem, the next Part 
proposes a radical shift in judicial review:  a parallel Chevron doctrine 
for agency constitutional interpretations when Congress has clearly 
delegated interpretive authority to agency expertise.    
VI.  TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL CHEVRON :  AGENCY  
EXPERTISE AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos was a revolutionary 
change to the way the Corps and the EPA define their own jurisdiction 
under the Clean Water Act.  After examining how the Corps and the 
EPA have responded, it is clear that the primary results of the ruling 
have been to add procedural density to the process of determining 
jurisdiction, and to force the Corps, populated with engineers and 
other scientific experts, to confine its reasoning to a judicially created 
doctrine instead of the flexible, case-by-case analysis previously used by 
the Corps and envisioned by Congress.  By regulating the JD process 
through guidance instead of rules, the agencies have retained some 
flexibility, and preserved the possibility of interdistrict variation and 
reliance on science.  This is not enough, however, to overcome the 
overall effect of post-Rapanos agency procedures, which has been to 
undercut the very aspects of agency decisionmaking that renders it 
separate, and sometimes superior, to judicial decisionmaking.  To 
combat this problematic outcome, the Supreme Court should explicitly 
adopt Chevron-style deference for agency constitutional interpretations 
where Congress has expressly delegated such interpretive power to 
agencies.    
Chevron deference is currently applied to most agency statutory  
interpretations, and requires courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.184  If the statute is unambigu-
ous, however, then the agency must follow its clear meaning.185  Justice 
 
184 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 
(1984).  
185 Id. at 842-43.  A court, in determining whether an agency’s interpretation is 
permissible, may consider all relevant sources of statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., INS 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427-43, 449 (1987) (analyzing a variety of sources, 
including legislative history, to determine whether two definitions of a statutory term 
had the same meaning).  While it is outside the scope of this Comment, a logical corol-
lary of my proposal may be to advocate for agencies being permitted and encouraged 
to consider a wider set of sources in interpreting statutes and the Constitution than 
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Stevens, writing for the Court in Chevron, was emphatic that this defer-
ence was due to institutional competence—unlike agencies, judges are 
not “experts in the field” and do not represent a “constituency” in the 
way agencies do.186  Justice Stevens acknowledged the value of policy 
choices in agency decisionmaking, recognizing that these types of de-
cisions are purposefully left to agencies under the assumption that 
they are best equipped to make them, and determined that courts 
should not disturb agency judgments unless they fall outside the 
bounds of reasonableness.187 
For agency actions that implicate constitutional questions, however, 
current Court doctrine affords no deference at all.  Instead, the Court 
applies the avoidance canon, wherein a court construes ambiguous 
statutes so as to avoid interpretations that raise constitutional prob-
lems.188  In a 2009 decision, the Court refused to acknowledge that 
agencies could have some role to play in constitutional interpretation, 
declined to remand the issue to the agency to reconsider its policy in 
light of constitutional considerations, and reserved constitutional issues 
exclusively for the courts.189  Thus, courts apply Chevron’s generous 
standard of review to agency statutory interpretation but apply a much 
more restrictive antideference to agency constitutional interpretations, 
apparently refusing to acknowledge the broad roles agencies already 
play in defining the outer bounds of the Constitution.190   
 
those used by courts.  See Mashaw, supra note 84, at 510-13 (explaining that agencies 
should look to a broad set of sources when conducting statutory interpretation).   
186 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.   
187 See id. at 866 (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provi-
sion, fairly conceptualized, . . . centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy . . . the 
challenge must fail.”).   
188 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499-
501 (1979)).    
189 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811-12 & n.3 (2009); see 
also Metzger, supra note 19, at 484 (arguing that the Court was wrong to disregard 
agencies’ role in crafting constitutional law, proposing instead that “constitutional law 
and ordinary administrative law are inextricably linked”).  For recent empirical work 
indicating that the Court does not always apply Chevron deference even when warranted, 
see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 23, at 1098-36, which proposes instead that the Court 
employs a “continuum” of deference.   
190 For a discussion of scholarly treatment of agencies’ role in constitutional inter-
pretation, see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.   
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Instead, courts should uphold an agency’s interpretation of an  
ambiguous constitutional provision so long as it is reasonable.  Similar 
to statutory Chevron deference, if either the text of the Constitution or 
Congress, via an implementing statute, has spoken clearly on an issue, 
then the agency must follow that clear meaning.191  Where the under-
lying constitutional issue is ambiguous, however, the agency should be 
free to interpret that provision as it sees fit, provided its interpretation 
is reasonable.  As the Court did in Chevron, an agency’s analysis may 
consider numerous sources of interpretation, primarily including leg-
islative intent, statutory purpose, and scientific or other determina-
tions delegated to agency expertise.192   
This type of deference will accomplish two goals:  first, it will 
acknowledge that agencies have already been defining the constitu-
tional landscape; and second, it will recognize that this type of consti-
tutionalism is normatively desirable.  In this sense, these views comple-
ment those of Eskridge and Ferejohn, who advocate for a more limited 
role for the judiciary in the modern state.193  They encourage judicial 
review that is both “deliberation-respecting” and “deliberation-
rewarding.”194  Using the former type of review, courts would aggres-
sively enforce some constitutional rights but leave a significant portion 
of rights to be defined by deliberative bodies such as agencies; under 
the latter, courts would be more likely to uphold agency decisions 
based on deliberation.195 
 
191 However, this clear meaning exception should not necessarily apply to agency 
treatment of Supreme Court precedents on point.  I take no position in this Comment 
on how agencies should handle precedent they believe to be directly at odds with the 
Constitution, but leave this reverse-deference debate for another day.  Other scholars, 
however, have argued that the legislative and executive branches should be free to dis-
regard Supreme Court precedent if unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Presidential Authority to 
Decline to Enforce Unconstitutional Statutes, supra note 13 (proposing that the execu-
tive branch has the authority to disregard unconstitutional Supreme Court precedent); 
Paulsen, supra note 11, at 223-25 (characterizing current executive deference to the 
Court as “too-feeble acquiescence” and advocating more robust power to disagree with 
unconstitutional Court holdings).   
192 While my proposal concerns constitutional interpretation, agency constitution-
alism necessarily is filtered through statutes.  Agencies are created by statutes and de-
signed to implement statutes.  There are no purely constitutionally derived agencies.   
193 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 58, at 6-9.  
194 Id. at 22-24 (emphasis omitted).   
195 Id. 
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In his more recent work, Eskridge has argued for antideference 
with respect to agency action raising serious constitutional concerns.196  
However, recognition of the prevalence of agency constitutionalism, 
coupled with a newfound understanding of the pitfalls of Supreme 
Court intervention in agency constitutional deliberation as exempli-
fied by the Corps’s post-Rapanos experience, compels the conclusion 
that a constitutional Chevron would best permit courts and agencies to 
fulfill their institutional expertise.   
Normatively, this standard allows Congress to “overlegislate” and to 
push its powers as far as possible.  Congress can then rely on agencies 
to scale back to what is practical, feasible, and in line with public opin-
ion.197  This technique is particularly effective for aspirational statutes, 
such as those protecting rights or, as in this case, the environment, in 
that it allows Congress to be as protective as possible without account-
ing for every potential practical issue ex ante.198  By interpreting stat-
utes based on their broader underlying purpose and proceeding 
flexibly, agencies can accommodate changing attitudes and expertise 
while remaining faithful to Congress’s underlying intent.199   
This proposal is controversial, particularly for those who place faith 
in the judiciary’s role as a rights-protecting backstop.200  However, 
agencies not only are more institutionally capable of performing this 
power-defining role than any other branch, but they also are account-
able to all three branches and public opinion to a degree that courts 
are not.201  From this perspective, agencies are both better equipped to 
perform this constitutional analysis and more likely to reflect demo-
cratic processes when doing so.  Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have 
made a parallel argument, contending that the same reason that justi-
 
196 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 23, at 115-17.  
197 See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 298 (1994).  
198 Id.   
199 An example of this is the EPA and Corps’s combining initial legislative intent, 
overall statutory purpose, and dynamic science into one coherent model of the CWA.  
See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. 
200 See, e.g., Alexander & Schauer, supra note 7, at 1362 (offering an unqualified de-
fense of total judicial supremacy).   
201 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984) (discussing the greater accountability of administrative agencies); Lee, supra 
note 15, at 884 (arguing that the FCC’s recent foray into administrative constitutional-
ism was “fed, shaped, and constrained by popular and democratic pressures”).   
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fies courts’ deference in the Chevron context—that courts are not “in-
stitutionally well equipped to make the relevant judgments”—justifies 
encouraging the executive branch to make similar determinations in 
the foreign relations context, subject to deferential review.202  Beyond 
competency arguments, Posner and Sunstein point out that this pro-
posal makes sense as a matter of constitutional structure, because the 
President has a distinct role in foreign relations.203  It would simplify 
the process and “ensure that the relevant judgments are made by those 
who are best suited to make them.”204   
Similar logic animates the application of Chevron to agency consti-
tutionalism.  First, this proposal makes sense as a matter of constitu-
tional structure, because Congress has expressly delegated to agencies 
powers within their expertise.  Second, the results of my empirical 
analysis reveal that allowing agencies to answer their own constitutional 
questions would largely eliminate the current system’s procedural den-
sity, simplify the process for all stakeholders, and allow for more public 
participation and less industry capture.  Finally, leaving constitutional 
determinations to those most capable of making them makes intuitive 
sense:  Congress delegated Commerce Clause definition, via jurisdic-
tional determinations, to the EPA and the Corps for a reason.   
Such a delegation is undermined when courts determine that they 
are better situated to make such determinations.  To borrow language 
from Posner and Sunstein, this is “a sensible recognition of the inevi-
table role that judgments of policy and principle play in resolving . . .  
ambiguities.”205  This argument is also premised on the fundamentally 
forward-looking nature of legislation, which delegates the details of 
implementation to expert agencies.  Agencies act prospectively, con-
sidering a broad range of factors and working with repeat players to 
develop policy flexibly and dynamically over time.  Courts, by contrast, 
are necessarily reactive, able only to determine the rights and remedies 
for parties to a particular action, bound by stare decisis, and restricted 
from experimenting too aggressively with new doctrine.  Absent a con-
stitutional Chevron, courts risk undermining the legislature’s ability to 
 
202 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. 1170, 1227-28 (2007).   
203 Id. at 1228. 
204 Id.   
205 Id. 
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accomplish its goals by unnecessarily shrinking the scope of its legisla-
tion.206  To avoid treading on Congress’s authority and inappropriately 
prioritizing the judiciary’s view over that of the legislature, courts 
should defer to agencies’ constitutional interpretations, particularly 
where they result from a clear congressional mandate to delegate such 
interpretations to agency expertise—like the EPA and the Corps’s  
jurisdictional determinations over wetlands.   
Although this constitutional Chevron makes normative sense from a 
rights-protecting and environmental-conservation standpoint, Supreme 
Court jurisprudence thus far has been intensely hostile to agency in-
terpretation of the “environmental Commerce Clause.”207  While these 
decisions may seem to track cleanly with the typically conservative view 
of limiting regulatory authority and congressional power, my analysis 
shows that the results of these decisions have, paradoxically, increased 
bureaucracy within agencies and forced them to shift the attendant 
costs on to those being regulated.  Thus, decisions designed to restrict 
the power of Congress and agencies have actually resulted in stable 
agency power but have forced the agencies to mask the exercise of that 
power in judicial terms and have shifted the enforcement costs to the 
private sector.   
This paradox could be avoided by granting deference to agency 
constitutional interpretations on issues that Congress explicitly dele-
gates to agency expertise.  Interpreting statutes that take the Com-
merce Clause to its limits necessarily entails some on-the-ground 
exercise of agency judgment.208  While the Corps may be the only agency 
 
206 See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 
1711-16 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases under-
mined congressional attempts to interpret the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments in line with Congress’s broader mandate from victory in the Civil War).     
207 See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 41-47 (2003) (describing how the Court’s jurisprudence “often precludes envi-
ronmental regulation at both the federal and state levels”).   
208 Cf. Stephanie Tai, Uncertainty About Uncertainty:  The Impact of Judicial Decisions on 
Assessing Scientific Uncertainty, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 714-25 (2009) (arguing that, in 
the Commerce Clause context, rather than taking a “substantive” approach in which it 
“focus[es] on substantive constitutional concerns raised by the agency decisions,” the 
Court should adopt a “limited articulation” approach under which it would grant def-
erence only where the legislature has acknowledged it was acting in an area of scientific 
uncertainty); Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules for Agency Interpretation:  
Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 845, 849-64 (2006) (pro-
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with a formal process for determining the scope and extent of the 
Commerce Clause implemented by rank-and-file agency personnel, 
other federal agencies necessarily make similar constitutional deci-
sions as part of their daily routine—just far less obviously.  The Corps’s 
experience with Rapanos is instructive, and reveals the dangers of 
courts overreaching into the territory of agency expertise.  To avoid 
frustrating both the conservation and protective functions of federal 
environmental law, as well as the industry’s desire to obtain permits 
without undue delay or unnecessary procedural hurdles, courts should 
defer to agency constitutional interpretations so long as these inter-
pretations are reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope and meaning of 
agency constitutional powers can have powerful effects that should 
push us to reevaluate the constitutional structure of our system of gov-
ernment.  In this Comment, I have shown how one such decision,  
Rapanos v. United States, has undermined the Army Corps of Engineers’ 
ability to determine its jurisdiction over wetlands and has forced  
expert personnel to grapple with complicated judicial doctrine and 
legal reasoning.  This graft erodes the very character of the Corps that 
caused Congress to delegate wetlands jurisdiction in the first place, 
and, as shown by my case study, inhibits the Corps from proceeding 
flexibly and incrementally and from making decisions based on science.   
Given these results, the Supreme Court should reevaluate its defer-
ence regime and grant Chevron deference to agency constitutional  
interpretation where Congress has expressly delegated such interpre-
tation to agency expertise.  Further, these results should push all three 
branches of government to reconsider their own powers to interpret 
the Constitution and affirmatively decide where power should lie as  
a descriptive, normative, and practical question.  There are no easy 
answers to this puzzle.  Although my proposal represents a step in the 
right direction, more work needs to be done—by scholars, judges, and 
legislators—to fully understand how exactly the Constitution is inter-
preted on the ground.  I hope this Comment opens such a dialogue.    
 
posing that when defining jurisdiction under the CWA, agencies should comply with 
the normative principles of representing policy input from all three branches, defer-
ring to scientific expertise, and increasing effectiveness).   
